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Why do reputable agents work for safer firms?
Fei Li, Masako Ueda
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Corresponding author for this work
Economics
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peer-review
4
Scopus citations
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Business & Economics
Hazard Models
100%
Investment Banks
91%
Venture Capitalists
87%
Funding
77%
Moral Hazard
77%