Why we don't deserve credit for everything we know

Jennifer Lackey*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

150 Scopus citations

Abstract

A view of knowledge-what I call the Deserving Credit View of Knowledge(DCVK)-found in much of the recent epistemological literature, particularly among so-called virtue epistemologists, centres around the thesis that knowledge is something for which a subject deserves credit. Indeed, this is said to be the central difference between those true beliefs that qualify as knowledge and those that are true merely by luck-the former, unlike the latter, are achievements of the subject and are thereby creditable to her. Moreover, it is often further noted that deserving credit is what explains the additional value that knowledge has over merely lucky true belief. In this paper, I argue that the general conception of knowledge found in the DCVK is fundamentally incorrect. In particular, I show that deserving credit cannot be what distinguishes knowledge from merely lucky true belief since knowledge is not something for which a subject always deserves credit.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)345-361
Number of pages17
JournalSynthese
Volume158
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1 2007

Keywords

  • Credit
  • Knowledge
  • Luck

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Social Sciences(all)

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