Abstract
This paper is a critical examination of Wittgenstein's view of the limits of intelligibility. In it I criticize standard analytic readings of Wittgenstein as an advocate of transcendental or behaviourist theses in epistemology; and I propose an alternative interpretation of Wittgenstein's view as a social contextualism that transcends the false dichotomy between Kantianism and psychologism. I argue that this social contextualism is strikingly similar to the social account of epistemic practices developed by Pierre Bourdieu. Through a comparison between Wittgenstein's and Bourdieu's view and an analysis of the notion of habitus , I try to show how social contextualism can account for the distinction between sense and nonsense without falling into transcendental constructivism or social behaviourism.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 293-318 |
Number of pages | 26 |
Journal | International Journal of Philosophical Studies |
Volume | 11 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Dec 1 2003 |
Keywords
- Bourdieu
- Contextualism
- Kantianism
- Nonsense
- Psychologism
- Wittgenstein
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy